FoRGED Act: Transforming America's Defense

Key Points

Section 101 of the FoRGED Act focuses on streamlining the defense acquisition process by repealing outdated and inefficient laws that have accumulated over decades, aiming to reduce bureaucratic complexity and accelerate procurement timelines. See the complete list of repealed codes for details.

History of the Recommendation

The history of Section 101 reflects a culmination of decades of efforts to reform defense acquisition laws. Since the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, as documented on history.defense.gov, numerous laws have been added to govern defense procurement. By the 1980s, GAO reports highlighted the growing complexity of these requirements, noting how layered regulations often conflicted or created redundancies. The Defense Science Board (dsb.cto.mil) in the 2000s identified regulatory burden as a key barrier to innovation, a concern echoed by innovation.defense.gov's assessments. The Section 809 Panel (2016-2019) extensively reviewed these laws, recommending significant repeals to streamline processes. Section 101 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, implements many of these recommendations, targeting specific provisions that impede efficient acquisition.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Eliminate redundant and outdated statutory requirements
• Reduce administrative burden on acquisition personnel
• Accelerate procurement timelines through simplified processes
• Enhance flexibility in acquisition approaches
• Remove barriers to innovation and competition

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Reduced oversight might increase risk of waste or abuse
• Elimination of some requirements could affect transparency
• Changes may create temporary confusion during transition
• Some stakeholders might lose established protections
• Simplified processes could overlook important considerations

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Implement alternative oversight mechanisms
• Provide comprehensive guidance on new procedures
• Phase implementation to manage transition
• Establish clear accountability measures
• Monitor outcomes to identify and address issues

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Contracting officers will need to adapt to streamlined procedures, requiring updated training. Program managers will gain more flexibility but need risk management skills. Acquisition executives will oversee implementation, ensuring proper controls. Legal staff will interpret changes, providing guidance on new requirements. Budget analysts will adjust to simplified reporting structures.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Congressional oversight committees may resist reduced reporting requirements. Some contractors might oppose changes to familiar processes. Advocacy groups could worry about reduced transparency. Small business advocates might fear reduced protections. Auditors may concern about oversight capabilities.

Additional Resources

DoD will need funding for training on new procedures, updated guidance documents, and transition support to ensure smooth implementation of the repeals.

Measures of Success

Success metrics include procurement timeline reduction (target: 25% faster), administrative cost savings (aim: 20% decrease), and increased competition (goal: 15% more offers), tracked quarterly.

Alternative Approaches

Gradual phase-out of requirements could offer more controlled transition. Pilot programs might test impact before full implementation. Regulatory rather than statutory changes could provide more flexibility.

Summary

Section 101 represents a bold move to modernize defense acquisition through targeted repeals of outdated laws, requiring careful implementation to balance efficiency with proper oversight.

Key Points

Section 102 of the FoRGED Act aims to streamline defense acquisition by modifying requirements, reducing bureaucratic burdens, and enhancing flexibility in the acquisition process. These modifications target amendments to titles 10 and 40 of the U.S. Code, particularly focusing on simplifying pricing information requirements when certified cost and pricing data is not needed.

History of the Recommendation

Section 102 of the FoRGED Act (S.5618), introduced by Senator Roger Wicker on December 19, 2024, focuses on modifying current defense acquisition requirements to enhance efficiency. It targets amendments to titles 10 and 40 of the U.S. Code, notably 10 USC 3705, to reduce information needed for pricing when certified cost and pricing data is not required. This reflects a broader push to address inefficiencies, as seen in GAO reports like GAO-25-107003, which criticized inconsistent policies despite the 2020 adaptive acquisition framework. The changes stem from the 2009 Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act and the Section 809 Panel's recommendations for simplifying processes, aligning with Senator Wicker's "Restoring Freedom's Forge: American Innovation Unleashed," emphasizing cutting red tape.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Reduced administrative burden by simplifying pricing information requirements
• Faster acquisition cycles, accelerating contract awards for quicker capability deployment
• Increased efficiency, lowering overheads and redirecting resources to mission-critical activities
• Enhanced competition, encouraging more contractor participation and potentially better prices
• Alignment with modern practices, adopting flexible strategies for today's defense needs

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Reduced transparency in pricing information might affect accountability
• Risk of inaccurate pricing without sufficient data
• Stakeholder resistance to process changes
• Potential compliance issues with new requirements
• Risk of system exploitation with reduced oversight

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Implement alternative reporting mechanisms like random audits
• Provide clear guidance and training on new pricing methods
• Phase implementation gradually, starting with low-risk contracts
• Engage stakeholders early to address concerns
• Maintain core oversight controls while streamlining processes

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Contracting officers will need to adapt to new pricing requirements and procedures. Program managers will manage modified acquisition processes. Financial analysts will implement new pricing methodologies. Acquisition staff will require training on streamlined procedures. Oversight personnel will adjust to modified reporting requirements.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Congressional oversight committees may resist reduced pricing information. Cost analysts might worry about pricing accuracy. Auditors could oppose streamlined requirements. Some contractors may prefer existing processes. Small businesses might fear competitive disadvantages.

Additional Resources

DoD will need funding for training on new pricing methods, updated guidance materials, and systems modifications to support streamlined processes.

Measures of Success

Success metrics include reduced acquisition cycle times (target: 30% faster), increased competition (aim: 25% more offers), and administrative cost savings (goal: 20% reduction), measured quarterly.

Alternative Approaches

Alternative approaches could include maintaining current requirements with process improvements, implementing pilot programs before full deployment, or focusing on regulatory rather than statutory changes.

Summary

Section 102 modernizes defense acquisition requirements, balancing efficiency with accountability through targeted modifications to existing processes.

Key Points

Section 103 of the FoRGED Act aims to streamline defense reporting by automatically sunsetting future statutory requirements after five years. This provision builds on past efforts to reduce bureaucratic burdens, as seen in GAO reports and prior legislative actions. The section amends Chapter 23 of Title 10, U.S. Code, by inserting Section 480a, establishing that any indefinite-duration report requirement enacted after the act's date will cease after five years unless explicitly renewed.

History of the Recommendation

Section 103 was introduced by Senator Roger Wicker on December 19, 2024, as part of the FoRGED Act (S.5618). The provision's roots trace back to defense acquisition reform efforts, particularly the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-23). The Section 809 Panel (2016-2019) recommended streamlining acquisition, influencing SEC. 103's focus on reducing reporting burdens. Past legislative actions, such as the repeal of specific annual reporting requirements under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, demonstrate Congress's recognition of the need to reduce unnecessary reporting.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Reduced bureaucratic burden by limiting reporting obligations
• Faster decision-making by freeing resources from unnecessary reports
• Improved resource allocation, focusing on mission-critical activities
• Encouragement of innovation by reducing paperwork for acquisition professionals
• Better alignment with modern practices, ensuring relevant reporting

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Loss of institutional memory if valuable reports lapse
• Reduced congressional oversight, affecting accountability
• Inconsistent reporting due to staggered expirations
• Increased effort to renew important reports, offsetting efficiency gains
• Risk of overlooking critical reports, creating information gaps

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Establish clear procedures for reviewing and renewing reports before sunset
• Create archives for critical historical data to preserve institutional memory
• Regularly update Congress on expiring reports to maintain oversight
• Provide funding and personnel to manage renewal processes efficiently
• Involve stakeholders early to identify and prioritize essential reports for renewal

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Reporting staff must adapt to new processes, potentially reducing workload but requiring review efforts. Program managers benefit from reduced reporting but may need to justify renewals for critical reports. Congressional staff rely on reports for oversight and may face gaps if not renewed. The acquisition workforce is indirectly affected by changes, potentially gaining time for innovation.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Congressional oversight committees are concerned about reduced transparency and oversight if reports lapse. Defense contractors may prefer status quo for reporting, fearing changes affect contract visibility. GAO and auditors worry about loss of data for evaluations, impacting accountability. Policy analysts fear gaps in data for long-term analysis, affecting strategic planning.

Additional Resources

Implementation requires training for staff on new sunset processes, policy development for clear guidance on reviewing and renewing reports, IT system upgrades for tracking expiring reports, and legal support to navigate challenges and ensure compliance.

Measures of Success

Success metrics include administrative cost reduction, time savings from reduced reporting, high renewal rate of critical reports, positive stakeholder feedback, and increased focus on innovation indicating successful burden reduction.

Alternative Approaches

Alternative approaches include periodic review without sunset, targeted repeals of specific outdated reports, enhanced automation to streamline reporting, and regular stakeholder consultations to identify unnecessary reports.

Summary

Section 103 aims to enhance efficiency by automatically sunsetting reporting requirements after five years unless renewed. While this promises reduced administrative burdens and increased innovation, careful implementation is needed to address risks of lost oversight and institutional memory. Success depends on effective training, IT systems, and stakeholder engagement.

Key Points

This section redefines the Program Executive Officer (PEO) role as the Portfolio Acquisition Executive (PAE) within the Department of Defense (DoD), aiming to enhance acquisition management.

History of the Recommendation

The transition from PEO to PAE in Section 201 of the FoRGED Act (S.5618) emerged from ongoing efforts to reform DoD acquisition processes. Historically, PEOs managed specific programs, a structure established under Title 10, U.S. Code, to oversee major defense acquisitions. Over time, critiques from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Congressional Research Service (CRS) highlighted inefficiencies, such as fragmented oversight and slow adaptation to technological advances. These concerns were echoed in prior National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs), including the FY 2020 NDAA (Public Law 116-92) and FY 2023 NDAA (Public Law 117-263), which began shifting focus toward portfolio-based management. Section 201 builds on these reforms by amending multiple sections of Title 10, replacing "program executive officer" with "portfolio acquisition executive" to formalize a broader, more integrated role. Introduced on December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, the provision reflects a legislative push to streamline defense innovation, drawing from recommendations on defense.gov and innovation.defense.gov.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Enhanced agility in managing multiple programs under a unified portfolio, enabling faster capability deployment
• Improved coordination by centralizing requirements, programming, and acquisition, reducing redundancies
• Greater innovation through a PAE's authority to adjust program scopes, fostering adaptability to emerging threats
• Strengthened accountability with direct control over staff and performance evaluations, ensuring alignment with DoD goals
• Streamlined decision-making, as PAEs oversee broader portfolios rather than isolated programs, accelerating procurement

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Over-centralization may overwhelm PAEs, delaying decisions on complex portfolios
• Reduced program-specific expertise as focus shifts from individual systems to broader oversight
• Resistance from existing PEOs could disrupt transition, affecting morale and continuity
• Inconsistent implementation across military departments might create disparities in acquisition efficiency
• Increased administrative burden from managing larger teams and evaluations could detract from operational focus

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Phased transition plans to manage workload, supported by interim deputies
• Specialized training to retain program-specific knowledge within PAE teams
• Change management programs to address resistance, ensuring stakeholder buy-in
• Standardized guidelines across departments to promote uniform adoption
• Delegation of routine tasks to deputies, freeing PAEs for strategic oversight

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Current PEOs, deputy PEOs, and acquisition workforce members will be most impacted. PEOs will transition to PAEs, gaining broader authority but facing increased responsibility. Deputies will shift to support portfolio-wide roles, potentially losing program-specific focus. Acquisition staff will report directly to PAEs, altering reporting chains and evaluation processes.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Existing PEOs may oppose the shift, fearing loss of autonomy and program control. Service acquisition executives might resist reduced influence over program assignments. Contractors could object if portfolio shifts disrupt established relationships, complicating contract management.

Additional Resources

The DoD will need funding for training programs, additional personnel to support PAEs (e.g., deputies, analysts), and IT systems to manage portfolio data effectively.

Measures of Success

Success can be gauged by reduced acquisition timelines, increased program delivery rates, cost savings from streamlined processes, PAE team performance metrics, and adaptability to new technologies.

Alternative Approaches

A hybrid model retaining PEOs for critical programs while introducing PAEs for oversight, or enhancing PEO authority without a full transition, could achieve similar goals with less disruption.

Summary

Section 201 aims to modernize DoD acquisition by transitioning PEOs to PAEs, rooted in reform efforts to boost efficiency. While promising agility and innovation, it risks over-centralization and resistance, necessitating careful mitigation and resource support. Success hinges on measurable outcomes and stakeholder adaptation.

Key Points

Section 202 of the FoRGED Act modifies the Joint Requirements Oversight Council's (JROC) responsibilities under Title 10, shifting its role from approving and prioritizing to reviewing joint military requirements, aiming to streamline defense processes.

History of the Recommendation

The JROC, established under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, was designed to enhance joint military capabilities by validating and prioritizing requirements. Over time, critiques from bodies like the Government Accountability Office (GAO) highlighted inefficiencies, noting overlapping roles with other Department of Defense (DoD) entities, slowing acquisition processes. This led to reform proposals, culminating in Section 202 of S.5618, introduced on December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker. The provision reflects decades of congressional and DoD efforts to refine oversight, drawing from reports on defense.gov and GAO analyses advocating for a less prescriptive JROC role to boost agility in military innovation.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Streamlines decision-making by reducing JROC's authority from approving to reviewing requirements, speeding up acquisition timelines
• Enhances collaboration with the newly established Joint Requirements and Programming Board (JRPB), ensuring broader input on joint needs
• Reduces bureaucratic overlap, clarifying JROC's advisory role versus execution responsibilities elsewhere in DoD
• Aligns requirements review with modern threats, fostering innovation by minimizing outdated validation hurdles
• Improves responsiveness to combatant commands by focusing JROC on strategic review rather than detailed approvals

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Risk of insufficient oversight, as JROC's reduced authority might miss critical requirement flaws
• Potential confusion in roles between JROC and JRPB, leading to duplicated efforts or gaps
• Loss of JROC's prioritization function could delay urgent capability deployments if JRPB lacks capacity
• Resistance from existing staff accustomed to JROC's broader mandate, slowing implementation
• Inconsistent requirement reviews across services, as JROC's lighter touch might unevenly affect joint standards

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Establish clear guidelines and training to ensure JRPB fills oversight gaps left by JROC
• Define distinct JROC-JRPB roles in policy, with regular coordination meetings to prevent overlap
• Implement a phased transition, retaining JROC prioritization temporarily until JRPB matures
• Offer change management support and communication to ease staff adjustment to new roles
• Monitor service-level outcomes via audits, adjusting JROC's review scope if disparities emerge

DoD Personnel Most Affected

The Chairman of the JROC, JROC members (e.g., Vice Chiefs of Staff), and JRPB co-chairs (Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation) will face shifted duties, requiring adaptation to a review-focused role. Program managers and acquisition staff will see faster requirement cycles, altering their planning timelines.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Military service branches may oppose this, fearing reduced control over joint requirements as JROC's authority wanes. Defense contractors might resist, preferring JROC's detailed approvals for predictable funding. Traditionalists within DoD could argue it weakens a proven oversight structure, risking capability gaps.

Additional Resources

DoD will need funding for JRPB setup, training for JROC/JRPB personnel on revised roles, and additional analysts to support JRPB's expanded review function, ensuring effective implementation without disrupting ongoing operations.

Measures of Success

Success can be gauged by reduced time from requirement identification to fielding (target: 20% faster), JRPB concurrence rates on JROC reviews (aim: 90%+), and combatant command feedback on capability relevance, tracked annually via DoD metrics.

Alternative Approaches

Retaining JROC's prioritization role but delegating approvals to JRPB could balance oversight and speed. Alternatively, enhancing JROC with digital tools for faster validation might achieve efficiency without structural change, leveraging innovation.defense.gov insights.

Summary

Section 202 aims to modernize JROC's role, promising faster acquisition but requiring careful management of oversight risks and stakeholder concerns through clear roles, training, and monitoring.

Key Points

Section 203 of the FoRGED Act modifies the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE)'s role, requiring Joint Requirements and Programming Board (JRPB) concurrence and refining functions to streamline DoD processes.

History of the Recommendation

The CAPE office, established by the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, aimed to provide independent cost and program analysis to the DoD. Over time, GAO reports highlighted inefficiencies in CAPE's autonomy, noting delays in aligning cost estimates with joint requirements. Congressional oversight, reflected in crsreports.congress.gov analyses, criticized CAPE's broad mandate as overlapping with other DoD entities, prompting reform. Section 203 of S.5618, introduced on December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, emerged from these critiques, drawing on defense.gov historical data and GAO recommendations to integrate CAPE more collaboratively with the JRPB, refining its scope to enhance acquisition efficiency.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Ensures CAPE analyses align with joint priorities via JRPB concurrence, improving requirement coherence
• Reduces CAPE's unilateral authority, speeding up decision-making in acquisition cycles
• Eliminates redundant functions (e.g., performance analysis), focusing CAPE on core cost assessments
• Simplifies aircraft procurement planning by removing CAPE's detailed submission requirements, enhancing flexibility
• Strengthens DoD's ability to adapt cost estimates to evolving threats, fostering innovation

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• JRPB concurrence may delay CAPE actions if board consensus is slow, stalling critical analyses
• Reduced CAPE autonomy could weaken independent oversight, risking biased cost estimates
• Eliminating performance analysis might leave gaps in program evaluation, affecting quality
• Simplified procurement plans could overlook long-term cost risks, impacting budget accuracy
• Over-reliance on JRPB might dilute CAPE's expertise, misaligning strategic priorities

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Set strict JRPB review timelines to prevent delays, ensuring timely CAPE outputs
• Retain CAPE's ability to flag concerns independently, preserving oversight integrity
• Shift performance analysis to another DoD entity, maintaining evaluation coverage
• Implement periodic CAPE-led procurement audits to catch overlooked risks
• Provide CAPE-JRPB joint training to align expertise and priorities effectively

DoD Personnel Most Affected

The CAPE Director and staff will adapt to JRPB collaboration, shifting from independent to coordinated roles. JRPB members, including co-chairs like the CAPE Director, will face increased workload integrating CAPE inputs. Acquisition program managers will adjust to streamlined CAPE processes, altering planning timelines.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

CAPE staff may resist reduced autonomy, valuing their independent role in ensuring unbiased analysis. Service branches could oppose JRPB oversight, fearing loss of control over cost priorities. Congressional budget hawks might object, citing risks to fiscal oversight from simplified CAPE functions.

Additional Resources

DoD will need funding for JRPB expansion, training for CAPE-JRPB coordination, and additional personnel to handle shifted functions like performance analysis, ensuring seamless implementation.

Measures of Success

Success can be measured by faster CAPE analysis turnaround (target: 15% reduction), high JRPB concurrence rates (aim: 85%+), and improved procurement cost accuracy, tracked via DoD annual reviews.

Alternative Approaches

Maintaining CAPE's independence but enhancing JRPB advisory input could balance oversight and speed. Alternatively, digitizing CAPE processes via innovation.defense.gov tools might streamline functions without structural changes.

Summary

Section 203 refines CAPE's role for efficiency, promising quicker, aligned cost assessments but requiring careful management of oversight risks and stakeholder concerns through training and clear protocols.

Key Points

Section 204 of the FoRGED Act establishes the Joint Requirements and Programming Board (JRPB) within the DoD, co-chaired by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) and the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), to streamline requirements and programming processes.

History of the Recommendation

The concept of a joint board like the JRPB evolved from decades of DoD efforts to integrate requirements and programming, rooted in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which created the JROC to unify military needs. Over time, GAO reports and crsreports.congress.gov analyses identified inefficiencies in JROC's broad mandate and CAPE's separate evaluation role, often causing delays in aligning capabilities with budgets. These concerns were echoed in prior National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs), including the FY 2020 NDAA (Public Law 116-92) and FY 2023 NDAA (Public Law 117-263), which began shifting focus toward portfolio-based management. Section 204 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, formalized this idea, building on prior reform proposals to create a single forum for joint decision-making, reflecting years of critique and innovation.defense.gov insights.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Centralizes JROC and CAPE functions, reducing overlap and accelerating capability development
• Enhances decision-making efficiency through majority-vote recommendations, streamlining approvals
• Integrates combatant command and acquisition perspectives via functional committees, improving requirement relevance
• Strengthens alignment between requirements and programming, ensuring fiscal feasibility
• Provides a unified interface with senior DoD leadership, enhancing strategic coherence

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Majority voting may marginalize minority views, risking overlooked critical needs
• Complex committee structure could slow decisions if quorum or coordination falters
• Reduced JROC autonomy might weaken its traditional oversight, creating gaps
• Heavy reliance on co-chairs could bottleneck processes if leadership disagrees
• New board might face initial resistance, delaying implementation as staff adapt

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Allow dissenting opinions to escalate to the Secretary, preserving minority input
• Establish strict timelines and proxy voting rules to maintain committee efficiency
• Phase JRPB implementation, retaining JROC's core roles until fully operational
• Train co-chairs in conflict resolution to prevent leadership gridlock
• Launch a change management program to ease staff transition to JRPB processes

DoD Personnel Most Affected

JROC Chairman and CAPE Director, as co-chairs, will shift to collaborative leadership roles. JROC members and CAPE staff will adapt to integrated duties within JRPB committees. Combatant commanders and acquisition executives, as committee members, will gain influence but face increased coordination demands.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

JROC traditionalists may resist, fearing loss of direct authority, valuing its historical role. Service branches could oppose, fearing diluted influence over joint requirements. CAPE analysts might object to shared control, preferring independent evaluations to maintain objectivity.

Additional Resources

DoD will require funding for JRPB staff, training for committee members on joint processes, and additional personnel to support the executive and functional committees, ensuring robust operation.

Measures of Success

Success can be tracked by reduced time from requirement to programming (target: 25% faster), high recommendation approval rates (aim: 80%+), and combatant command satisfaction with capability alignment, assessed annually.

Alternative Approaches

Enhancing JROC-CAPE collaboration without a new board could maintain existing structures while improving integration. Alternatively, a digital platform linking requirements and programming, per innovation.defense.gov, might achieve efficiency without reorganization.

Summary

Section 204 establishes the JRPB to unify DoD processes, promising efficiency but requiring careful management of resistance and complexity through training and phased rollout.

Key Points

Section 205 of the FoRGED Act introduces a capstone requirements approach in Title 10, empowering portfolio acquisition executives (PAEs) to enhance speed, agility, and innovation in military capability development through flexible, iterative processes.

History of the Recommendation

The capstone requirements concept emerged from decades of DoD struggles with rigid, slow acquisition processes, as critiqued in GAO reports and crsreports.congress.gov analyses. Traditional system-specific requirements, rooted in Cold War-era frameworks, often delayed fielding capabilities, a concern echoed in defense.gov histories. The 2016 National Defense Authorization Act's push for agility spurred experimentation with portfolio-based approaches, with innovation.defense.gov highlighting prototyping successes. GAO and Defense Science Board (dsb.cto.mil) studies criticized static requirements for stifling innovation, advocating broader, outcome-focused frameworks. Section 205 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, codified these ideas, integrating Joint Requirements and Programming Board (JRPB) consultation to align with modern threats, building on years of reform momentum.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Accelerates capability delivery by enabling PAEs to adjust program scope iteratively
• Boosts innovation through prototyping and minimum viable products, shaping requirements dynamically
• Enhances operational relevance by embedding operational representatives in acquisition
• Simplifies procurement of commercial items, validated by operational needs, cutting delays
• Aligns portfolios with strategic goals via capstone sets, maximizing force effectiveness

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Flexibility might weaken oversight, risking misaligned capabilities
• Iterative changes could confuse developers, increasing costs or delays
• Operational representatives may lack acquisition expertise, skewing priorities
• Rapid commercial item adoption might bypass rigorous testing, compromising quality
• Portfolio focus could neglect system-specific needs, fragmenting joint interoperability

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Require JRPB audits to ensure capstone alignment with DoD objectives
• Establish integration benchmarks to maintain system cohesion
• Provide collaboration training and tools to streamline interactions
• Mandate minimum testing standards for commercial items before fielding
• Retain key performance parameters for critical systems, ensuring interoperability

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Portfolio acquisition executives will gain authority but face pressure to adapt quickly. Operational representatives will shift to active acquisition roles, requiring new skills. Military department secretaries and defense agency directors will oversee implementation, adjusting oversight. Acquisition staff will adapt to dynamic requirements, altering workflows.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Traditional acquisition managers may resist, fearing loss of control over detailed specifications. Service branches could oppose, worried about reduced influence on system-specific needs. Contractors might object, preferring predictable, rigid requirements for stable funding.

Additional Resources

DoD will need funding for prototyping facilities, training for PAEs and operational reps on capstone processes, and additional staff to support JRPB consultations and portfolio management.

Measures of Success

Success can be measured by reduced fielding times (target: 30% faster), increased prototype-to-field transitions (aim: 50%+), and operational feedback satisfaction rates (goal: 80%+), tracked via DoD reports.

Alternative Approaches

Enhancing existing agile frameworks like Middle Tier Acquisition could achieve flexibility without new structures. Alternatively, a digital requirements platform, per innovation.defense.gov, might streamline processes within current systems.

Summary

Section 205 aims to modernize acquisition with capstone requirements, promising speed and innovation but requiring robust oversight and training to mitigate risks and resistance.

Key Points

Section 301 of the FoRGED Act eliminates the pre-Milestone A determination requirement, adjusts CAPE functions, and refines cost estimate mandates to streamline early acquisition phases.

History of the Recommendation

The Milestone A process, formalized under the 2001 National Defense Authorization Act, aimed to ensure early DoD acquisition decisions were grounded in rigorous assessments, as noted in crsreports.congress.gov. Over time, GAO reports criticized its rigidity, arguing it delayed innovation by mandating premature determinations before sufficient data existed, a view echoed in discover.dtic.mil analyses. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 refined this, but inefficiencies persisted, with defense.gov histories highlighting slow capability fielding. Section 301 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, responded to these critiques, drawing on innovation.defense.gov insights and GAO calls for agility, removing Section 4251 to reduce early bureaucratic hurdles while adjusting CAPE's role for consistency.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Speeds up acquisition by removing pre-Milestone A determinations, enabling faster program starts
• Reduces administrative burden, freeing resources for development over documentation
• Focuses cost estimates on later phases, aligning analysis with mature program data
• Clarifies CAPE's role, eliminating redundant oversight for early milestones
• Encourages innovation by lowering early-stage barriers, supporting rapid prototyping

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Reduced early oversight might greenlight unviable programs, wasting resources
• Delayed cost estimates could obscure risks until later, inflating budgets
• Less CAPE involvement early may weaken cost discipline, risking overruns
• Rapid starts might overwhelm acquisition staff, leading to errors
• Skipping initial checks could misalign programs with strategic needs

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Implement risk reviews by JRPB to catch unviable programs early
• Mandate preliminary cost screenings before major commitments
• Retain CAPE advisory input for high-risk early decisions
• Train staff on accelerated processes to handle increased pace
• Align programs with capstone requirements to ensure strategic fit

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Acquisition program managers will adapt to faster timelines with less early oversight, shifting focus to later phases. CAPE staff will see reduced pre-Milestone A duties, redirecting efforts. Military department secretaries will oversee streamlined approvals, adjusting risk management.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

CAPE analysts may resist, valuing early cost oversight to prevent overruns. Service branches could oppose, fearing rushed programs might neglect service-specific needs. Congressional budget hawks might object, citing reduced transparency in early funding decisions.

Additional Resources

DoD will require funding for risk review tools, training for acquisition staff on new processes, and additional analysts to support later-phase cost estimates.

Measures of Success

Success can be gauged by shorter pre-Milestone A timelines (target: 20% reduction), lower early-phase cancellation rates (aim: <10%), and cost estimate accuracy in later phases (goal: 90%+), tracked annually.

Alternative Approaches

Retaining a simplified Milestone A checklist could balance speed and oversight. Alternatively, a digital risk dashboard, per innovation.defense.gov, might streamline assessments without repeal.

Summary

Section 301 aims to accelerate acquisitions by cutting early red tape, promising efficiency but requiring careful risk management and training to offset oversight gaps.

Key Points

Section 302 of the FoRGED Act amends Section 4211 of Title 10, refining acquisition strategies for major defense programs by emphasizing portfolio-based approaches, flexibility, and collaboration to enhance efficiency and innovation.

History of the Recommendation

The acquisition strategy framework under Section 4211 evolved from the Defense Acquisition System, formalized in the 1970s to manage complex procurements, as detailed on history.defense.gov. Over decades, GAO reports criticized its rigidity, noting delays in adapting to modern threats, a concern echoed in crsreports.congress.gov analyses. The 2016 NDAA introduced adaptive acquisition concepts, but inefficiencies persisted, with discover.dtic.mil studies highlighting slow technology integration. Section 302 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, responded to these critiques, building on GAO and Defense Science Board (dsb.cto.mil) calls for agile, portfolio-driven strategies, removing outdated references like major automated information systems and aligning decision authority with portfolio acquisition executives (PAEs).

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Shifts focus to portfolio-level capabilities, enabling flexible, rapid fielding over rigid end-item focus
• Promotes incremental delivery with mature tech, reducing delays and fostering adaptability
• Enhances collaboration with science, tech, and nontraditional contractors, boosting innovation
• Integrates sustainment and technical data needs early, improving long-term efficiency
• Streamlines decision-making by empowering PAEs and requiring regular strategy updates

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Broad portfolio focus might dilute oversight, risking misaligned capabilities
• Incremental approach could fragment systems, complicating integration
• Increased collaboration may overwhelm coordination, slowing decisions
• Flexible resourcing might lead to budget overruns if not tightly controlled
• Frequent strategy updates could disrupt program stability, confusing stakeholders

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Mandate JRPB reviews to ensure portfolio alignment with DoD goals
• Establish integration benchmarks to maintain system cohesion
• Provide collaboration training and tools to streamline interactions
• Enforce resource caps with PAE accountability to prevent overruns
• Standardize update protocols to minimize disruption and clarify changes

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Portfolio acquisition executives will gain broader authority, requiring strategic oversight skills. Service acquisition executives and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment will adapt to redefined decision roles. Acquisition workforce members will shift to portfolio management, needing new training.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Traditional program managers may resist, preferring specific end-item control over portfolio flexibility. Service branches could oppose, fearing reduced influence on tailored systems. Contractors might object, valuing predictable, large-scale contracts over decomposed projects.

Additional Resources

DoD will need funding for portfolio management tools, training for PAEs and staff on agile strategies, and additional personnel to support collaborative and testing processes.

Measures of Success

Success can be measured by faster capability delivery (target: 25% reduction), higher innovation adoption rates (aim: 30%+), and stakeholder satisfaction (goal: 80%+), tracked via DoD metrics.

Alternative Approaches

Enhancing existing adaptive frameworks like Middle Tier Acquisition could achieve flexibility without statutory change. A digital strategy platform, per innovation.defense.gov, might improve coordination without restructuring.

Summary

Section 302 modernizes acquisition strategies for agility and innovation, promising efficiency but requiring robust oversight and training to address risks and resistance.

Key Points

Section 303 of the FoRGED Act exempts nontraditional defense contractors (NDCs), as defined in 10 U.S.C. A 3014, from specific cost accounting and acquisition regulations to encourage their participation in DoD contracts.

History of the Recommendation

The push to integrate NDCs�?"firms not historically tied to DoD contracts�?"began with the 2016 NDAA, which defined them under 10 U.S.C. A 3014 as entities not recently engaged in DoD contracts subject to full cost accounting standards, per crsreports.congress.gov. This aimed to tap commercial innovation, but GAO reports noted the narrow definition excluded many capable firms due to stringent criteria. Defense Science Board (dsb.cto.mil) and innovation.defense.gov studies criticized barriers like cost accounting deterring agile startups. Congressional pushes for reform, reflected in prior NDAAs and discover.dtic.mil analyses, sought to widen NDC eligibility. Section 303 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, targeted specific DFARS clauses and FAR Part 31, reflecting years of DoD and legislative intent to streamline engagement with NDCs, as seen in prior reforms and discover.dtic.mil findings.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Increases NDC participation by removing complex cost accounting barriers
• Speeds up acquisition timelines with simplified compliance for innovative firms
• Enhances access to commercial tech, boosting DoD capability modernization
• Reduces administrative costs for NDCs, making DoD contracts more appealing
• Fosters competition, diversifying the defense industrial base

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Reduced oversight might obscure cost transparency, risking overpayments
• Exemptions could disadvantage traditional contractors, skewing competition
• Inconsistent standards may complicate contract management across vendors
• Lack of cost data might hinder audits, increasing fraud potential
• Rapid integration of NDCs could strain DoD oversight capacity

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Require simplified cost reporting from NDCs to maintain visibility
• Offer incentives to traditional contractors to level the playing field
• Standardize basic oversight protocols for all contractors
• Enhance audit training and tools to detect fraud without full cost data
• Phase NDC exemptions, allowing DoD to scale oversight capacity

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Contracting officers will adapt to managing NDCs with less data, requiring new evaluation skills. Acquisition staff will manage a broader contractor base, adjusting workflows. Auditors will verify certifications, requiring new financial analysis expertise.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Traditional defense contractors may resist, fearing competitive disadvantage from lighter NDC rules. DoD auditors could oppose, citing oversight risks with high NDC participation. Congressional budget hawks might object, worried about unproven firms wasting funds.

Additional Resources

DoD will require funding for revised oversight tools, training for staff on new definitions, and additional personnel to oversee expanded NDC contracts and audits.

Measures of Success

Success can be measured by NDC contract awards (target: 20% increase), acquisition timeline reductions (aim: 15% faster), and tech innovation uptake (goal: 25%+ new solutions), tracked annually.

Alternative Approaches

Tailored DFARS waivers for specific NDC traits could refine eligibility without broad redefinition. A pilot program testing reduced regulations, per innovation.defense.gov, might refine the approach incrementally.

Summary

Section 303 seeks to draw NDCs into DoD contracting with regulatory relief, promising innovation but requiring careful oversight adjustments to manage risks and opposition.

Key Points

Section 304 of the FoRGED Act amends 10 U.S.C. A 3457, mandating that certain products and services be treated as commercial, with waivers requiring written justification, to simplify DoD acquisitions.

History of the Recommendation

The push to classify more DoD procurements as commercial began with the 1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, aiming to leverage commercial markets, as noted in crsreports.congress.gov. Over time, GAO reports identified persistent barriers, like overly restrictive definitions, slowing access to innovative solutions, a concern echoed in discover.dtic.mil studies. The 2016 NDAA expanded commercial item preferences, but implementation lagged, per defense.gov histories. Defense Science Board critiques (dsb.cto.mil) highlighted how noncommercial rules deterred suppliers. Section 304 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, refined this approach, shifting "may" to "shall" in 10 U.S.C. A 3457 and adding waiver rigor, reflecting years of reform efforts to align DoD with commercial practices, per innovation.defense.gov insights.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Simplifies procurement by mandating commercial treatment, reducing red tape
• Speeds up acquisition timelines, leveraging commercial market efficiencies
• Expands supplier pool, attracting firms deterred by complex rules
• Lowers costs through commercial pricing and competition
• Enhances innovation access by aligning DoD with commercial standards

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Over-classification as commercial might bypass necessary oversight, risking quality
• Waiver process could slow decisions if justifications are overly bureaucratic
• Traditional suppliers may lose contracts, disrupting established relationships
• Inadequate market research might misclassify items, inflating costs
• Reduced scrutiny could weaken accountability, increasing fraud risk

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Establish clear quality benchmarks for commercial classifications
• Streamline waiver approvals with predefined criteria and timelines
• Offer transition support to traditional suppliers to adapt
• Train staff on robust market research to ensure accurate classifications
• Implement random audits to maintain accountability without heavy oversight

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Contracting officers will shift to assessing commercial viability, requiring new skills. Heads of contracting activities will oversee waivers, adding decision-making duties. Acquisition staff will adapt to faster, less regulated processes, altering workflows.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Traditional defense contractors may resist, fearing lost business to commercial firms. DoD auditors could oppose, citing reduced oversight as a transparency risk. Congressional overseers might object, worried about accountability in spending.

Additional Resources

DoD will need funding for market research tools, training for staff on commercial rules, and additional personnel to manage waivers and audits.

Measures of Success

Success can be gauged by increased commercial contracts (target: 25% rise), reduced procurement times (aim: 20% faster), and supplier diversity (goal: 15%+ new vendors), tracked annually.

Alternative Approaches

Guidance enhancing commercial flexibility within existing rules could avoid statutory change. A phased pilot, per innovation.defense.gov, might test impacts before full adoption.

Summary

Section 304 aims to streamline DoD acquisitions with mandatory commercial treatment, promising efficiency and innovation but needing careful oversight and training to mitigate risks.

Key Points

Section 305 of the FoRGED Act amends 10 U.S.C. A 3014, expanding the definition of nontraditional defense contractors (NDCs) to include entities with rapid growth, significant R&D reinvestment, or recent equity funding, aiming to broaden DoD's access to innovative firms.

History of the Recommendation

The concept of NDCs emerged in the 2016 NDAA, defining them under 10 U.S.C. A 3014 as entities not recently engaged in DoD contracts subject to full cost accounting standards, per crsreports.congress.gov. This aimed to tap commercial innovation, but GAO reports noted the narrow definition excluded many capable firms due to stringent criteria. Defense Science Board (dsb.cto.mil) and innovation.defense.gov studies criticized barriers like cost accounting deterring agile startups. Congressional pushes for reform, reflected in prior NDAAs and discover.dtic.mil analyses, sought to widen NDC eligibility. Section 305 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, responded by adding financial growth, R&D, and equity metrics, building on years of DoD and legislative efforts to integrate dynamic commercial entities, per history.defense.gov insights.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Expands NDC pool, including fast-growing firms with over 30% revenue growth
• Encourages R&D-focused companies by recognizing 10%+ reinvestment
• Attracts venture-backed startups with recent 5%+ equity funding
• Enhances DoD access to cutting-edge tech from nontraditional sources
• Reduces entry barriers, fostering competition and innovation

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Broadened criteria might include less stable firms, risking contract failures
• Self-certification could lead to inaccurate claims, complicating verification
• Traditional contractors may face unfair competition, losing market share
• Rapid onboarding of new NDCs might overwhelm DoD oversight capacity
• Focus on financial metrics could overlook technical capability, misaligning priorities

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Require financial stability audits alongside growth certifications
• Implement third-party verification for self-certified claims
• Offer incentives to traditional contractors to maintain balance
• Phase NDC integration with scaled oversight resources
• Add technical competency checks to complement financial criteria

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Contracting officers will evaluate new NDC metrics, needing updated skills. Acquisition staff will manage a broader contractor base, adjusting workflows. Auditors will verify certifications, requiring new financial analysis expertise.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Traditional contractors may resist, fearing lost contracts to less-regulated NDCs. DoD auditors could oppose, citing verification challenges and oversight risks. Congressional budget hawks might object, worried about unproven firms wasting funds.

Additional Resources

DoD will require funding for verification systems, training for staff on new definitions, and additional personnel to oversee expanded NDC contracts.

Measures of Success

Success can be tracked by NDC contract growth (target: 20% increase), innovation adoption rates (aim: 25%+ new tech), and contract success rates (goal: 90%+), assessed annually.

Alternative Approaches

Tailored waivers for specific NDC traits could refine eligibility without broad redefinition. A pilot program testing expanded criteria, per innovation.defense.gov, might optimize implementation.

Summary

Section 305 broadens the NDC definition to boost innovation, promising a diverse contractor base but requiring robust verification and oversight to address risks and opposition.

Key Points

Section 306 of the FoRGED Act allows agency heads to use alternative capability-based analysis to assess pricing fairness for commercial products or services from nontraditional defense contractors (NDCs), emphasizing value over traditional cost metrics.

History of the Recommendation

The push for alternative pricing models in DoD acquisitions traces back to critiques of rigid cost-plus contracting, as noted in GAO reports. Traditional methods, rooted in the 1940s wartime economy per history.defense.gov, struggled with innovative commercial entities like NDCs, defined under 10 U.S.C. A 3014 since 2016. Defense Science Board studies (dsb.cto.mil) highlighted how standard pricing deterred NDCs, whose value often lies in agility and unique capabilities rather than auditable costs. The 2018 NDAA introduced flexibilities like Other Transaction Authorities, but pricing remained a hurdle, per crsreports.congress.gov. Section 306 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, emerged from these concerns, integrating innovation.defense.gov insights and GAO calls for value-based assessments to better engage NDCs, refining prior reform efforts.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Enables fair pricing based on product fitness, aligning costs with mission needs
• Recognizes NDC expertise and non-federal investment, encouraging innovation
• Incorporates NDC business models, fostering scalable DoD investments
• Highlights cost avoidance and capacity gains, optimizing resource use
• Integrates military user input, ensuring operational relevance in pricing

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Subjective analysis might overvalue unproven capabilities, inflating costs
• Limited cost data could obscure financial risks, complicating oversight
• NDC-focused pricing may disadvantage traditional contractors, skewing competition
• Complex evaluations might slow procurement, negating speed goals
• Inconsistent application across agencies could lead to pricing disparities

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Develop standardized value metrics to limit subjectivity
• Require baseline financial disclosures from NDCs for transparency
• Offer parallel pricing options for traditional contractors
• Train evaluators on streamlined analysis to maintain efficiency
• Establish agency-wide guidelines to ensure pricing consistency

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Agency heads will oversee implementation, requiring strategic pricing decisions. Contracting officers will shift to capability-based assessments, needing new skills. Acquisition staff will adapt to evaluating diverse data, altering workflows. Military users will provide input, increasing their role in procurement.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Traditional contractors may resist, fearing competitive bias toward NDCs. DoD auditors could oppose, citing reduced cost visibility as an accountability risk. Congressional overseers might object, worried about justifying expenditures without traditional data.

Additional Resources

DoD will need funding for analysis tools, training for staff on capability-based methods, and additional personnel to handle complex evaluations and oversight.

Measures of Success

Success can be measured by NDC contract uptake (target: 15% increase), procurement speed (aim: 20% faster), and cost savings or capability gains (goal: 10%+ improvement), tracked annually.

Alternative Approaches

Tailored cost-plus adjustments for NDCs could balance innovation and oversight. A digital pricing platform, per innovation.defense.gov, might standardize value assessments without statutory change.

Summary

Section 306 aims to align pricing with NDC value, promising innovation and efficiency but requiring robust guidelines and training to manage risks and opposition.

Key Points

Section 307 of the FoRGED Act adjusts procurement thresholds in Title 10, raising the simplified acquisition threshold to $10M, micro-purchase threshold to $100K, and small business reservation to $500K, aiming to streamline DoD purchasing.

History of the Recommendation

Procurement thresholds in U.S. defense policy trace back to the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, which set the simplified acquisition threshold at $100K (later adjusted to $250K via 41 U.S.C. A 134) to expedite small purchases, per crsreports.congress.gov. GAO reports consistently flagged these limits as outdated, slowing DoD's ability to acquire innovative solutions amid rising costs and complexity, a view shared in discover.dtic.mil studies. The 2016 NDAA raised micro-purchase limits to $10K, but calls persisted for higher thresholds to match inflation and operational needs, per defense.gov histories. Section 307 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, reflected these critiques, drawing on Defense Science Board (dsb.cto.mil) and innovation.defense.gov recommendations to significantly elevate thresholds, building on decades of iterative reform to enhance acquisition agility.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Raise simplified acquisition threshold to $10M, speeding up larger purchases
• Increases micro-purchase threshold to $100K, simplifying small transactions
• Boosts small business reservation to $500K, expanding opportunities for small firms
• Reduces administrative overhead by aligning thresholds with modern costs
• Enhances flexibility for rapid capability fielding, supporting innovation

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Higher thresholds might reduce oversight, risking wasteful spending
• Increased micro-purchases could strain budget tracking, obscuring costs
• Small business focus might exclude capable larger firms, limiting competition
• Rapid purchases may bypass thorough vetting, compromising quality
• Elevated limits could overwhelm contracting capacity, causing delays

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Implement random audits to maintain fiscal accountability
• Enhance tracking systems for micro-purchases to ensure visibility
• Balance small business awards with open competitions
• Require basic quality checks for high-threshold buys
• Train additional staff to handle increased procurement volume

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Contracting officers will manage higher-value transactions, needing updated skills. Acquisition staff will adapt to streamlined processes, shifting focus to oversight. Small business liaisons will oversee expanded $500K reservations, increasing workload.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Congressional budget overseers may resist, fearing less transparency in spending. Traditional contractors could oppose, worried about losing out to small businesses. DoD auditors might object, citing oversight risks with high thresholds.

Additional Resources

DoD will need funding for audit tools, training for staff on new thresholds, and additional personnel to manage higher-value procurements and small business contracts.

Measures of Success

Success can be gauged by faster procurement times (target: 20% reduction), small business contract growth (aim: 15% increase), and cost overrun rates (goal: <5%), tracked annually.

Alternative Approaches

Gradual threshold increases tied to inflation could maintain control while adapting. A digital procurement platform, per innovation.defense.gov, might streamline without broad hikes.

Summary

Section 307 seeks to modernize procurement thresholds for efficiency and innovation, but requires robust oversight and training to address risks and stakeholder concerns.

Key Points

Section 308 of the FoRGED Act amends 10 U.S.C. A 3458, enhancing the authority for Commercial Solutions Openings (CSOs) by allowing sole-source follow-on contracts, delegating approval to contracting activity heads, and mandating open solicitations for nontraditional defense contractors (NDCs) within DoD frameworks.

History of the Recommendation

The CSO authority, codified in the 2017 NDAA as 10 U.S.C. A 3458, emerged from DoD efforts to leverage commercial innovation, building on the 1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act's push for simplified procurement. GAO reports criticized traditional processes for delaying access to cutting-edge solutions, a concern echoed in crsreports.congress.gov analyses. The Defense Science Board (dsb.cto.mil) and innovation.defense.gov advocated for flexible mechanisms like CSOs to engage NDCs, noting their agility. Early CSO use showed promise but faced limits, such as restrictive follow-on rules and high-level approval bottlenecks, per discover.dtic.mil findings. Section 308 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, refined this framework, drawing on prior NDAA reforms and DoD Adaptive Acquisition Framework (e.g., DoDI 5000.85) to streamline and expand CSO utility, reflecting years of iterative policy evolution.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Simplifies follow-on contracts with sole-source options, speeding up capability delivery
• Delegates approval to contracting activity heads, reducing bureaucratic delays
• Mandates open CSOs for NDCs, broadening access to innovative vendors
• Aligns CSOs with agile acquisition pathways, enhancing flexibility
• Encourages rapid prototyping and fielding, leveraging commercial solutions

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Sole-source awards might reduce competition, raising costs or favoritism risks
• Delegation could lead to inconsistent oversight across contracting activities
• NDC focus may exclude capable traditional contractors, limiting options
• Agile pathway reliance might prioritize speed over thorough vetting, risking quality
• Broadened authority could strain oversight resources, increasing error potential

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Require periodic competition reviews for sole-source contracts
• Standardize delegation guidelines to ensure uniform oversight
• Allow traditional contractors to compete in parallel solicitations
• Mandate minimum quality checks within agile pathways
• Increase staffing and training for CSO oversight roles

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Heads of contracting activities will gain authority, requiring strategic decision-making skills. Contracting officers will manage expanded CSO processes, adapting to NDC-focused solicitations. Portfolio acquisition executives and systems command staff will oversee new open solicitations, increasing workload and coordination demands.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Traditional contractors may resist, fearing exclusion from NDC-centric CSOs. Congressional overseers could oppose, citing reduced competition and oversight risks. DoD auditors might object, worried about accountability with sole-source flexibility.

Additional Resources

The DoD will need funding for CSO management tools, training for staff on agile pathways and NDC engagement, and additional personnel to support expanded solicitations and oversight.

Measures of Success

Success can be measured by faster contract awards (target: 20% reduction), NDC participation rates (aim: 25% increase), and capability fielding speed (goal: 30% faster), tracked via DoD metrics.

Alternative Approaches

Enhancing existing Other Transaction Authorities could achieve flexibility without CSO changes. Alternatively, a pilot program testing expanded CSO authority, per innovation.defense.gov, might refine implementation incrementally.

Summary

Section 308 aims to streamline CSOs for speed and innovation, promising efficiency but requiring careful competition and oversight balance through training and guidelines.

Key Points

Section 309 of the FoRGED Act amends 10 U.S.C. A 4022, refining the use of Other Transaction (OT) authority by adjusting approval thresholds, clarifying definitions, and adding flexibility for rapid production to meet warfighter needs.

History of the Recommendation

The Other Transaction authority, originating in the 1958 Space Act for NASA and extended to DoD in 1989 via 10 U.S.C. A 2371 (later A 4022), aimed to bypass traditional procurement for innovative R&D, as noted on congress.gov. GAO reports highlighted its early success in engaging nontraditional contractors but flagged inconsistent use and oversight gaps. The 2016 NDAA expanded OT scope to prototypes, per history.defense.gov, while subsequent NDAAs (e.g., 2018) added follow-on production options, responding to Defense Science Board (dsb.cto.mil) calls for agility. Innovation.defense.gov and discover.dtic.mil studies noted OT's potential for rapid fielding was hampered by restrictive thresholds and unclear authority. Section 309 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, builds on this evolution, raising approval limits, refining terms, and adding production flexibility, reflecting decades of iterative reform to enhance DoD's acquisition speed.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Raise OT threshold to $100M, streamlining larger prototype and production deals
• Clarify head of contracting activity role, ensuring high-level oversight consistency
• Define follow-on production broadly, enabling seamless prototype-to-field transitions
• Allow rapid production awards without competition, addressing urgent warfighter needs
• Enhance flexibility for DARPA, DIU, and MDA directors, fostering innovation

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Higher thresholds might reduce scrutiny, risking cost overruns
• Non-delegable authority could bottleneck approvals, delaying action
• Broad follow-on definition may blur prototype-production lines, causing confusion
• Non-competitive awards could limit fairness, raising favoritism concerns
• Rapid fielding might prioritize speed over quality, deploying untested systems

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Require periodic cost reviews for high-value OTs
• Streamline approval processes with clear timelines
• Issue guidance distinguishing prototype and production phases
• Mandate justification audits for non-competitive awards
• Enforce minimum testing standards before rapid fielding

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Heads of contracting activities will oversee larger OTs, requiring strategic decision-making. DARPA, DIU, and MDA directors will gain authority, adapting to non-delegable roles. Service acquisition executives will justify rapid production, increasing responsibility. Contracting officers will manage expanded OT scope, needing new skills.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Traditional contractors may resist, fearing non-competitive awards favor NDCs. Congressional overseers could oppose, citing reduced transparency in high-value deals. DoD auditors might object, worried about oversight challenges with rapid fielding.

Additional Resources

The DoD will need funding for OT tracking systems, training for staff on new rules, and additional personnel to manage increased OT volume and audits.

Measures of Success

Success can be gauged by OT award speed (target: 25% faster), rapid fielding instances (aim: 20% increase), and capability deployment success (goal: 90%+), tracked annually.

Alternative Approaches

Tailored OT thresholds by agency could balance flexibility and control. A digital OT management platform, per innovation.defense.gov, might enhance efficiency without broad changes.

Summary

Section 309 enhances OT authority for speed and innovation, promising rapid capability delivery but needing oversight and training to mitigate risks and opposition.

Key Points

Section 310 of the FoRGED Act establishes a default presumption that DoD acquisitions are commercial, requiring justification for non-commercial designations and prioritizing commercial procedures to streamline procurement.

History of the Recommendation

The drive to prioritize commercial products and services in DoD acquisitions began with the 1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, aiming to leverage market efficiencies, as noted in crsreports.congress.gov. GAO reports repeatedly identified barriers, such as overly restrictive commercial item definitions, slowing access to innovative solutions, a concern echoed in discover.dtic.mil analyses. The 2016 NDAA expanded commercial preferences, but implementation lagged, with defense.gov histories noting persistent bureaucratic hurdles. Defense Science Board critiques (dsb.cto.mil) emphasized that defense-unique requirements often excluded viable commercial options unnecessarily. Section 310 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, builds on these efforts, mandating a default commercial assumption and rigorous justification for exceptions, reflecting decades of efforts and innovation.defense.gov insights to align DoD with commercial practices.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Establishes a default commercial presumption, simplifying procurement processes
• Reduces defense-unique developments by favoring commercial solutions, cutting costs
• Encourages use of general solicitation under A 3458, speeding up acquisitions
• Enhances transparency with required justification for non-commercial designations
• Boosts access to innovative commercial products, meeting DoD needs efficiently

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Over-reliance on commercial defaults might overlook critical defense-specific needs
• Justification requirements could delay procurements if overly bureaucratic
• Commercial bias may disadvantage traditional contractors, reducing competition
• Inadequate market research might misclassify items, inflating costs
• Reduced defense-unique focus could weaken specialized capability development

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Require operational reviews to ensure commercial fits meet mission needs
• Streamline justification processes with clear, time-bound criteria
• Offer incentives for traditional contractors to adapt to commercial norms
• Train contracting officers on robust market research standards
• Retain flexible exceptions for critical defense-unique projects

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Contracting officers will shift to assessing commercial viability, requiring new evaluation skills. Heads of contracting activities will approve non-commercial determinations, adding oversight duties. Program managers will justify requirement rigidity, increasing accountability.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Traditional defense contractors may resist, fearing lost business to commercial firms. DoD program managers could oppose, valuing flexibility for defense-unique needs. Congressional overseers might object, citing risks to specialized capabilities.

Additional Resources

DoD will need funding for market research tools, training for staff on commercial procedures, and additional personnel to handle justification reviews and audits.

Measures of Success

Success can be measured by commercial contract increases (target: 20% rise), procurement time reductions (aim: 15% faster), and cost savings (goal: 10%+), tracked annually.

Alternative Approaches

Guidance enhancing commercial flexibility within current rules could avoid statutory overhaul. A phased pilot, per innovation.defense.gov, might test impacts incrementally.

Summary

Section 310 aims to streamline DoD acquisitions with a commercial focus, promising efficiency and innovation but needing careful oversight and training to balance risks and opposition.

Key Points

Section 311 of the FoRGED Act mandates DoD procurement officials to adopt efficient, commercially acceptable transaction and payment methods, including expanded use of the Government purchase card up to $25M, while restricting certain contract types and financing terms.

History of the Recommendation

The push for commercially aligned payment methods in DoD procurement traces back to the 1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, which introduced simplified procedures and encouraged commercial practices, as documented on congress.gov. GAO reports over decades criticized slow adoption, noting traditional cost-based contracts and restrictive payment rules hindered engagement with commercial vendors, per gao.gov findings. The Government purchase card, introduced in the 1980s and expanded via the 1998 Federal Acquisition Regulation, aimed to expedite small purchases, but limits remained low, per crsreports.congress.gov. Defense Science Board studies (dsb.cto.mil) and innovation.defense.gov insights highlighted inefficiencies in applying cost accounting standards to commercial deals. Section 311 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, builds on these reforms, raising purchase card limits and mandating commercial methods, reflecting years of effort to modernize DoD transactions, per history.defense.gov.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Streamlines procurement with efficient, commercial transaction methods
• Expands purchase card use to $25M, speeding up acquisitions
• Bans flexibly priced contracts, reducing administrative burdens
• Limits advance payments to 15%, aligning with commercial norms
• Enhances flexibility for commercial and nondevelopmental item buys

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Higher purchase card limits might reduce oversight, risking misuse
• Banning flexible contracts could limit options for complex needs
• Low advance payment caps may deter vendors needing upfront funds
• Rapid transactions could strain budget tracking, obscuring costs
• Commercial focus might overlook defense-specific requirements

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Enforce strict card use audits and limits per warrant
• Allow exceptions for flexible contracts with justification
• Offer phased payments for vendors needing more support
• Upgrade tracking systems for real-time expenditure visibility
• Require operational reviews to ensure mission fit

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Procurement officials will adopt new methods, requiring updated skills. Contracting officers will manage higher-value card transactions, adjusting oversight roles. Financial managers will track rapid payments, needing enhanced tools and training.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Traditional contractors may resist, fearing loss of flexibly priced contracts. DoD auditors could oppose, citing oversight risks with high card limits. Congressional budget overseers might object, worried about transparency in fast transactions.

Additional Resources

DoD will need funding for advanced tracking systems, training for staff on commercial methods, and additional personnel to oversee high-value card use and audits.

Measures of Success

Success can be measured by transaction speed (target: 20% faster), card usage growth (aim: 30% increase), and cost savings (goal: 10%+), tracked annually.

Alternative Approaches

Gradual card limit increases with pilot testing could refine implementation. Enhanced FAR guidance on commercial payments, per innovation.defense.gov, might avoid statutory changes.

Summary

Section 311 aims to modernize DoD payments with commercial efficiency, promising speed and flexibility but requiring robust oversight and training to address risks and opposition.

Key Points

Section 312 of the FoRGED Act mandates public posting of DoD contract awards and agreements within a reasonable time, considering operational security, with details on quantities and prices to enhance transparency.

History of the Recommendation

The call for transparency in DoD contract awards traces back to the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006, which aimed to make federal spending publicly accessible, as noted on congress.gov. GAO reports highlighted persistent opacity in defense contracting, with delays and incomplete data undermining oversight, per gao.gov findings. The 2014 Digital Accountability and Transparency Act (DATA Act) further pushed for standardized, public financial data, influencing DoD policies, per crsreports.congress.gov. Defense Science Board critiques (dsb.cto.mil) emphasized that secretive awards hindered accountability and innovation adoption. Section 312 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, builds on these efforts, mandating timely public notices with specific transaction details, reflecting decades of reform to balance security and openness, per history.defense.gov insights.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Increases public visibility of contract awards, fostering trust in DoD spending
• Provides detailed pricing and quantity data, enabling better cost analysis
• Encourages accountability by exposing awards to public scrutiny
• Balances transparency with security through reasonable timing flexibility
• Supports competitive bidding by revealing market trends to vendors

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Public disclosure might compromise operational security if timing is misjudged
• Detailed data could aid adversaries in analyzing DoD capabilities
• Increased scrutiny may deter vendors fearing exposure or criticism
• Administrative burden of posting could delay contract execution
• Inconsistent "reasonable time" definitions might confuse stakeholders

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Establish clear security review protocols before posting
• Redact sensitive operational details while retaining core data
• Offer vendor opt-in for anonymized listings where feasible
• Automate posting processes to minimize delays
• Define "reasonable time" in policy (e.g., 30 days) for consistency

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Contracting officers will prepare and post notices, requiring new workflows. Public affairs staff will manage postings and security reviews, increasing coordination duties. Program managers will ensure compliance, adding oversight tasks.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Defense contractors may resist, fearing competitive disadvantage from price exposure. DoD security officials could oppose, citing risks to operational secrecy. Congressional overseers might object, worried about overburdening staff without clear benefits.

Additional Resources

DoD will need funding for automated posting systems, training for staff on transparency rules, and additional personnel to handle security reviews and public inquiries.

Measures of Success

Success can be gauged by posting timeliness (target: 90% within 30 days), public access rates (aim: 20% increase in views), and audit compliance (goal: 95%+), tracked annually.

Alternative Approaches

A tiered disclosure system (e.g., summary data only) could balance transparency and security. A digital dashboard, per innovation.defense.gov, might streamline access without statutory mandates.

Summary

Section 312 seeks to enhance DoD contract transparency, promising accountability and trust but requiring careful security and efficiency measures to address risks and opposition.

Key Points

Section 313 of the FoRGED Act amends Title 10, adding � 3459 to limit mandatory flowdown of contract clauses to subcontractors supplying commercial products or services, restricting requirements to legally mandated clauses and simplifying implementation with single clauses for commercial and noncommercial contracts

History of the Recommendation

The concept of limiting contract clause flowdown to subcontractors emerged from efforts to streamline DoD procurement, rooted in the 1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, which encouraged commercial item use, per congress.gov. GAO reports consistently flagged excessive flowdown requirements as a barrier, burdening subcontractors with compliance costs and deterring commercial firms, per gao.gov findings. The 2016 NDAA expanded commercial preferences, but crsreports.congress.gov noted persistent over-application of clauses like cost accounting standards to commercial subcontracts. Defense Science Board studies (dsb.cto.mil) and innovation.defense.gov critiques highlighted how this complexity slowed innovation adoption. Section 313 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, builds on these reforms, responding to decades of calls for simplicity by restricting flowdown to legally required clauses listed under 10 U.S.C. � 3452, reflecting a shift toward commercial efficiency, per discover.dtic.mil analyses.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Reduces compliance burden by limiting flowdown to legally required clauses
• Simplifies subcontracts with a single commercial clause, easing administration
• Encourages commercial subcontractor participation by cutting regulatory overhead.
• Aligns DoD with commercial practices, enhancing procurement efficiency
• Speeds up contract execution by reducing negotiation complexity.

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Reduced clauses might weaken oversight, risking subcontractor accountability
• Single-clause approach could overlook unique project needs, causing gaps.
• Traditional contractors may face uneven compliance burdens, skewing competition
• Limited flowdown might miss critical safeguards, increasing fraud risk.
• Rapid implementation could confuse staff, delaying transitions

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Conduct periodic audits to ensure subcontractor compliance.
• Allow tailored clause additions with justification for specific needs Traditional contractors may face uneven compliance
Standardize baseline requirements across all contractors
• Enhance training on fraud detection without extensive clauses
• Phase implementation with clear guidance and support

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Contracting officers will adapt to streamlined clause management, requiring updated skills. Subcontract administrators will oversee simplified agreements, shifting focus to performance monitoring. Legal and compliance staff will revise DFARS updates within 180 days, increasing workload initially.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Traditional contractors may resist, fearing competitive disadvantage from lighter commercial rules. DoD auditors could oppose, citing reduced oversight as a transparency risk. Congressional overseers might object, worried about accountability gaps in subcontractor performance.

Additional Resources

DoD will need funding for DFARS revision tools, training for staff on new rules, and additional personnel to manage audits and transition support within 120-180 days.

Measures of Success

Success can be measured by subcontractor participation growth (target: 15% increase), contract award speed (aim: 20% faster), and compliance issues (goal: <5%), tracked post-120-day implementation.

Alternative Approaches

Tailored flowdown waivers could balance simplicity and oversight. A digital clause management system, per innovation.defense.gov, might streamline without broad statutory change.

Summary

Section 313 aims to simplify subcontracting for commercial products, promising efficiency and participation but needing robust oversight and training to address risks and opposition.

Key Points

Section 314 of the FoRGED Act amends 10 U.S.C. A 3452, refining how defense-unique laws and clauses apply to commercial product and service procurements, limiting their inclusion unless explicitly justified by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, to streamline DoD commercial acquisitions.

History of the Recommendation

The effort to adjust the application of legal provisions to DoD commercial procurement began with the 1994 Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, aiming to leverage commercial markets, as noted in crsreports.congress.gov. GAO reports highlighted persistent issues, with defense-unique clauses often applied unnecessarily, deterring commercial vendors, per gao.gov findings. The 2016 NDAA refined this framework, but crsreports.congress.gov analyses showed persistent overreach of post-1994 laws complicating commercial buys. Defense Science Board critiques (dsb.cto.mil) emphasized that defense-unique requirements often excluded viable commercial options unnecessarily. Section 314 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, responds to these concerns, requiring explicit justification for applying post-1994 provisions, building on decades of reform to enhance efficiency, per history.defense.gov insights.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Limits defense-unique provisions to legally required ones, simplifying procurement
• Requires justification for post-1994 clause inclusion, reducing regulatory creep
• Extends streamlined rules to subcontracts, easing commercial supplier entry
• Tailors off-the-shelf item rules, aligning with commercial practices
• Enhances DoD flexibility, speeding up access to commercial innovations

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Reduced clause application might weaken oversight, risking compliance gaps
• Justification process could delay urgent procurements if cumbersome
• Commercial focus may disadvantage traditional contractors, reducing competition
• Inadequate market research might misclassify items, inflating costs
• Reduced defense-unique focus could weaken specialized capability development

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Conduct regular compliance audits to ensure accountability
• Streamline justification with predefined criteria and timelines
• Offer parallel opportunities for traditional contractors
• Retain flexible exceptions for critical defense-unique projects
• Publish clear guidance on determination processes

DoD Personnel Most Affected

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment will make written determinations, increasing decision-making responsibility. Contracting officers will adapt to simplified rules, requiring updated skills. Procurement staff will manage revised DFARS lists, shifting focus to compliance monitoring.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Traditional contractors may resist, fearing loss of advantage from complex clauses. DoD legal and audit teams could oppose, citing reduced oversight as a risk to accountability. Congressional overseers might object, worried about bypassing post-1994 laws critical to defense needs.

Additional Resources

DoD will need funding for DFARS updates, training for staff on new rules, and additional personnel to support determinations and audits.

Measures of Success

Success can be measured by reduced procurement times (target: 15% faster), commercial contract growth (aim: 20% increase), and compliance rates (goal: 95%+), tracked post-implementation.

Alternative Approaches

Selective clause waivers could balance simplicity and oversight. A digital compliance tool, per innovation.defense.gov, might streamline without broad statutory change.

Summary

Section 314 aims to streamline commercial procurement, promising efficiency and innovation but requiring careful oversight and training to mitigate risks and opposition.

Key Points

Section 315 of the FoRGED Act amends 10 U.S.C. A 3458, establishing consortia of nontraditional defense contractors (NDCs) for prototype and production projects under OT authority, leveraging agile DoD acquisition pathways to enhance innovation.

History of the Recommendation

The roots of Section 315 trace to the 2016 NDAA, which defined NDCs under 10 U.S.C. A 3014 and expanded Commercial Solutions Openings (CSOs) via A 3458 to tap commercial innovation, per congress.gov. GAO reports noted traditional procurement's rigidity deterred NDCs, slowing tech adoption, a concern echoed in crsreports.congress.gov analyses. The 2018 NDAA broadened Other Transaction (OT) authority under A 4022, aiming for agility, as documented on history.defense.gov. Defense Science Board studies (dsb.cto.mil) and innovation.defense.gov critiques highlighted NDC potential, but limited CSO scope and consortium use persisted, per discover.dtic.mil findings. Section 315 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, builds on these reforms, mandating NDC-only consortia tied to DoD's Adaptive Acquisition Framework (DoDI 5000.2), reflecting years of effort to integrate NDCs effectively.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Establishes NDC consortia, boosting collaboration on innovative prototypes
• Links CSOs to OT authority, streamlining follow-on production
• Limits consortia to NDCs, prioritizing agile, nontraditional vendors
• Leverages agile pathways (e.g., middle tier), speeding up capability delivery
• Enhances DoD access to cutting-edge commercial solutions

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Excluding traditional contractors might reduce competition, raising costs
• NDC-only focus could limit expertise, risking project failures
• Agile pathways might skip rigorous testing, compromising quality
• Consortium management could strain DoD resources, causing delays
• Over-reliance on NDCs may neglect proven traditional capabilities

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Allow periodic open competitions alongside consortia
• Require NDCs to partner with experienced subcontractors
• Mandate minimum validation standards within pathways
• Allocate dedicated staff to oversee consortia operations
• Balance NDC projects with traditional contractor engagements

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Systems command leaders and portfolio acquisition executives will establish and manage consortia, increasing oversight duties. Contracting officers will execute OT and CSO agreements, needing NDC-specific skills. Acquisition staff will align projects with agile pathways, adapting workflows.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Traditional contractors may resist, fearing exclusion from lucrative prototype projects. DoD program managers could oppose, valuing established vendors for reliability. Congressional overseers might object, citing risks of untested NDC reliance over proven firms.

Additional Resources

DoD will need funding for consortia infrastructure, training for staff on NDC engagement and agile pathways, and additional personnel to support consortia and ensure compliance.

Measures of Success

Success can be gauged by NDC prototype awards (target: 20% increase), fielding speed (aim: 25% faster), and project success rates (goal: 90%+), tracked via DoD metrics post-implementation.

Alternative Approaches

Expanding existing CSOs to include NDCs without consortia could maintain flexibility. A hybrid model blending traditional and NDC vendors, per innovation.defense.gov, might balance innovation and reliability.

Summary

Section 315 aims to harness NDC innovation through targeted consortia, promising rapid capability gains but requiring careful resource allocation and oversight to address exclusion risks and opposition.

Key Points

Section 316 of the FoRGED Act mandates service and component acquisition executives to establish competitive prototyping within DoD by April 1, 2025, requiring separate program managers and contracting officers to oversee distinct prototypes, with an independent down-select to choose a winner for potential sole-source follow-on contracts.

History of the Recommendation

The push for competitive prototyping in DoD program management evolved from decades of acquisition reform efforts aimed at enhancing efficiency and innovation. The 1986 Packard Commission report, per history.defense.gov, first emphasized competition to improve outcomes, influencing later policies. GAO reports consistently criticized slow, single-contractor approaches, advocating for parallel prototyping to reduce risk and accelerate fielding, as seen in gao.gov analyses. The 2016 NDAA introduced Middle Tier Acquisition pathways, per crsreports.congress.gov, promoting rapid prototyping, but lacked structured competition. Defense Science Board studies (dsb.cto.mil) and innovation.defense.gov insights highlighted success in competitive models like DARPA's programs. Section 316 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, formalizes this approach, mandating at least three annual programs per service, building on prior reforms to institutionalize competition, per discover.dtic.mil findings.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Fosters innovation by pitting alternative prototypes against each other
• Speeds up acquisition through parallel development and streamlined processes
• Improves quality by selecting winners based on user-evaluated prototypes
• Reduces risk with competitive down-select identifying the best solution
• Enhances efficiency with exemptions from lengthy bureaucratic requirements

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Increased costs from funding multiple prototypes simultaneously
• Potential bias in down-select if evaluators favor familiarity
• Overstretched resources might delay other programs
• Exemption from JCIDS could misalign prototypes with strategic needs
• Sole-source follow-ons might reduce long-term competition

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Require periodic competition reviews for sole-source contracts
• Standardize delegation guidelines to ensure uniform oversight
• Allow traditional contractors to compete in parallel solicitations
• Mandate minimum quality checks within agile pathways
• Increase staffing and training for competitive prototyping roles

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Service and component acquisition executives will establish competitive prototyping programs, requiring strategic planning skills. Program managers and contracting officers will oversee distinct prototypes, needing new skills. Acquisition staff will adapt to competitive prototyping processes, altering workflows.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Traditional contractors may resist, fearing competitive disadvantage from parallel prototyping. DoD program managers could oppose, valuing established vendors for reliability. Congressional overseers might object, citing risks of untested prototype reliance over proven firms.

Additional Resources

DoD will need funding for competitive prototyping infrastructure, training for staff on new processes, and additional personnel to support competitive prototyping and oversight.

Measures of Success

Success can be measured by increased competition (target: 20% more competitive programs), reduced fielding times (aim: 25% faster), and improved quality (goal: 90%+ successful prototypes), tracked annually.

Alternative Approaches

Enhancing existing Middle Tier Acquisition pathways could achieve competition without new structures. Alternatively, a digital prototyping platform, per innovation.defense.gov, might streamline competitive processes within current systems.

Summary

Section 316 aims to institutionalize competitive prototyping, promising innovation and efficiency but requiring careful management of risks and opposition through training and guidelines.

Key Points

Section 317 of the FoRGED Act adds 10 U.S.C. A 3602, establishing two middle-tier acquisition pathways�?"rapid prototyping and rapid fielding�?"under the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, replacing prior authority from the 2016 NDAA to streamline DoD rapid acquisition processes.

History of the Recommendation

The middle-tier acquisition (MTA) concept emerged from decades of DoD efforts to accelerate procurement amid critiques of slow, rigid processes. The 1986 Packard Commission, per history.defense.gov, urged faster fielding, setting the stage for later reforms. GAO reports highlighted delays in traditional acquisition, advocating for agile alternatives, as seen on gao.gov. The 2016 NDAA (Section 804, Public Law 114-92) introduced MTA pathways�?"rapid prototyping and fielding�?"to bypass cumbersome requirements like the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), per crsreports.congress.gov. Defense Science Board analyses (dsb.cto.mil) and innovation.defense.gov praised MTA's success in programs like the Air Force's rapid prototyping efforts, but noted inconsistent implementation. Section 317 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, codifies and refines this authority into Title 10, replacing the 2016 NDAA provision with structured pathways, reflecting years of feedback and DoD Instruction 5000.2 evolution, per discover.dtic.mil.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Speeds prototyping with fieldable solutions in five years, enhancing agility
• Enables rapid fielding of proven tech within six months, accelerating deployment
• Streamlines processes, cutting approval times to six months, boosting efficiency
• Empowers program managers with flexibility, reducing bureaucratic delays
• Supports iterative prototyping and fielding, fostering continuous innovation

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Bypassing JCIDS might misalign acquisitions with strategic needs
• Rapid timelines could compromise testing, risking capability flaws
• Increased program manager autonomy might lead to inconsistent outcomes
• Limited oversight could raise costs or delays if mismanaged
• Focus on speed might neglect long-term sustainment planning

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Require strategic alignment checks before pathway entry
• Mandate minimum operational testing standards
• Provide standardized training for program managers
• Implement periodic cost and progress audits
• Integrate lifecycle cost reviews into rapid fielding plans

DoD Personnel Most Affected

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment will oversee pathway establishment, increasing strategic responsibilities. Program managers will gain autonomy and technical staff, requiring new skills and coordination. Service acquisition executives will serve as decision authorities or delegate, adjusting oversight roles. Contracting officers and technical staff will support rapid processes, adapting to expedited timelines.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Traditional contractors may resist, fearing reduced influence in streamlined processes. DoD oversight bodies could oppose, citing risks from limited JCIDS involvement. Congressional overseers might object, worried about accountability with faster, less-regulated acquisitions.

Additional Resources

DoD will need funding for prototyping facilities, training for managers and staff on pathways, and additional personnel to support technical teams and audits.

Measures of Success

Success can be measured by prototype fielding times (target: <5 years), production start within six months (aim: 90% compliance), and capability effectiveness (goal: 85%+ user satisfaction), tracked annually.

Alternative Approaches

Enhancing existing MTA guidance without codification could maintain flexibility. A digital acquisition platform, per innovation.defense.gov, might accelerate processes without statutory overhaul.

Summary

Section 317 refines middle-tier acquisition for speed and innovation, building on prior reforms, but requires robust oversight and resources to balance risks and ensure alignment with DoD goals.

Key Points

Section 318 of the FoRGED Act adds 10 U.S.C. A 3603, codifying software acquisition pathways for applications and embedded systems, replacing prior authority from the 2020 NDAA to streamline DoD software and hardware acquisition with agile, risk-based processes.

History of the Recommendation

The push for tailored software acquisition pathways in DoD began with recognition of traditional processes' inefficiencies for software, rooted in hardware-focused models from the 1960s, per history.defense.gov. GAO reports highlighted delays and cost overruns in software projects under DoD Directive 5000.01, advocating agile methods, as seen on gao.gov. The 2018 Defense Science Board study (dsb.cto.mil) urged adaptive acquisition for software, influencing the 2020 NDAA (Section 800, Public Law 116-92), which introduced a software pathway framework, per congress.gov. CRS analyses (crsreports.congress.gov) noted its success in projects like Kessel Run but flagged inconsistent application. Innovation.defense.gov and discover.dtic.mil documented DoD's shift toward iterative development. Section 318 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, codifies and refines this into Title 10, replacing the 2020 NDAA authority with structured pathways, reflecting years of iterative reform to meet modern software demands.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Establishes tailored pathways, enhancing software acquisition efficiency
• Speeds delivery with one-year fielding goals, meeting urgent needs
• Exempts software from JCIDS and 5000.01, reducing bureaucratic delays
• Promotes continuous user engagement, aligning solutions with operational use
• Enables iterative updates, ensuring cyber-secure, adaptable capabilities

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Exemption from JCIDS might misalign software with strategic goals
• Rapid timelines could skip rigorous testing, risking flaws
• Broad pathway flexibility might lead to inconsistent implementation
• Focus on speed could neglect long-term sustainment planning
• Limited oversight might increase costs or security vulnerabilities

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Require initial strategic alignment reviews
• Mandate minimum cybersecurity and testing standards
• Issue standardized pathway implementation guides
• Integrate sustainment planning into annual updates
• Conduct regular audits to monitor costs and security

DoD Personnel Most Affected

The Secretary of Defense will oversee pathway establishment, increasing strategic duties. Program managers will manage rapid development and user engagement, needing agile skills. Contracting officers will award contracts under expedited processes, adapting to new timelines. Software engineers and operational users will collaborate closely, shifting to iterative feedback roles.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Traditional contractors may resist, fearing loss of influence in streamlined processes. DoD oversight bodies could oppose, citing risks from bypassing JCIDS and 5000.01. Congressional overseers might object, worried about accountability with reduced formal controls.

Additional Resources

DoD will require funding for development tools, training for staff on agile methods, and additional personnel to support rapid acquisition, testing, and cybersecurity oversight.

Measures of Success

Success can be gauged by software fielding within one year (target: 85% compliance), update frequency (aim: annual delivery), and user satisfaction (goal: 90%+), tracked post-implementation.

Alternative Approaches

Enhancing existing software pathways via DoDI 5000.87 could avoid statutory overhaul. A digital acquisition platform, per innovation.defense.gov, might streamline processes without codification.

Summary

Section 318 codifies agile software pathways, promising rapid, user-focused delivery but requiring robust oversight and resources to balance speed with quality and alignment.

Key Points

Section 319 of the FoRGED Act requires the Secretary of Defense to issue guidance within 180 days to prevent unfair competitive advantages by technical advisors in DoD acquisitions, repealing prior 2016 NDAA authority and mandating a report within one year.

History of the Recommendation

The concern over unfair competitive advantages in DoD acquisitions dates back decades, with roots in the 1986 Packard Commission's push for fair competition. Early efforts focused on contractor conflicts, but scrutiny grew over technical advisors�?"science and technology reinvention laboratories (STRLs), federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), and nonprofits�?"due to their dual roles in advising and potentially competing for contracts. GAO reports in the 2000s flagged risks of bias from unequal access to acquisition data. The 2016 NDAA (Section 881, Public Law 114-92) introduced initial steps to address this, mandating conflict-of-interest policies for advisors. However, implementation gaps persisted, as noted in subsequent analyses, with advisors still influencing awards unfairly. Section 319 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, refines this framework, driven by ongoing concerns over transparency and competition, replacing the 2016 authority with stricter, codified guidance and oversight.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Prevents technical advisors from unfairly influencing contract awards
• Enhances competition by limiting advisors' acquisition roles
• Improves transparency with clear conflict reporting processes
• Allows waivers for unbiased advisors, maintaining expertise access
• Ensures accountability with disciplinary actions for violations

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Restricting advisors might reduce technical expertise availability
• Waiver process could delay critical acquisition decisions
• Increased oversight might overburden program offices
• Broad definitions may exclude qualified advisors unnecessarily
• Focus on advisors could miss broader contractor conflicts

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Expand advisor pools with external experts
• Streamline waiver approvals with clear criteria
• Automate oversight reporting to reduce workload
• Refine advisor definitions for precision
• Broaden conflict checks to all acquisition players

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Acquisition officials will implement new guidance, adapting to restricted advisor roles. Program managers will report violations and oversee waivers, increasing responsibilities. Contracting officers will enforce policies, needing conflict management skills. STRL and FFRDC staff will face limits on acquisition tasks, shifting focus to technical advice only.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

STRLs and FFRDCs may resist, fearing reduced influence and funding. Contractors could oppose, preferring current advisor access for competitive edge. DoD technical staff might object, valuing advisors' dual roles for efficiency.

Additional Resources

DoD will need funding for oversight systems, training on conflict policies within 180 days, and personnel to manage waivers and compliance by the one-year report deadline.

Measures of Success

Success can be measured by conflict violation reports (target: <5% annually), waiver processing time (aim: <30 days), and competitive award fairness (goal: 90%+ perceived equitable), assessed post-report.

Alternative Approaches

Enhanced ethics training for advisors could address biases without restrictions. A digital conflict tracking tool might improve transparency more efficiently than new guidance.

Summary

Section 319 strengthens fairness in acquisitions by curbing advisor advantages, building on past efforts, but requires balancing expertise loss and oversight burden with robust implementation.

Key Points

Section 320 of the FoRGED Act amends 10 U.S.C. A 4023, expanding the scope of experimental procurement, allowing modified purchases, and permitting follow-on production contracts without competitive procedures if endorsed by a combatant command, enhancing DoD's flexibility in testing and fielding innovative solutions.

History of the Recommendation

The authority for DoD experimental procurement originated in the 1940s under Title 10's precursor statutes, enabling purchases for testing new technologies, as noted on history.defense.gov. Initially codified as 10 U.S.C. A 2373 in 1994, it was redesignated A 4023 in 2021, focusing on specific categories like ordnance and aeronautical supplies. GAO reports criticized its narrow scope, arguing it limited innovation amid evolving threats, per gao.gov. The Defense Science Board (dsb.cto.mil) and innovation.defense.gov pushed for broader authority to test diverse prototypes rapidly. Congressional efforts, including the 2016 NDAA's prototyping expansions, set the stage, but restrictions persisted. Section 320 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, reflected these critiques, broadening eligible items and easing follow-on processes, building on decades of reform to align experimental procurement with modern needs, per crsreports.congress.gov.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Expands scope to diverse defense-related articles, fostering broader experimentation
• Allows modified purchases, enhancing flexibility in testing adaptations
• Permits follow-on production without competition, speeding capability fielding
• Reduces procedural hurdles, accelerating innovation deployment
• Aligns procurement with combatant command needs, improving operational relevance

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Skipping competition might raise costs or favor certain vendors
• Broad scope could lead to unfocused spending, wasting resources
• Rapid fielding might bypass thorough testing, risking failures
• Lack of notification could reduce transparency, complicating oversight
• Over-reliance on combatant command input might skew priorities

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Require periodic cost-benefit reviews for follow-on contracts
• Set clear criteria for experimental project selection
• Mandate minimum testing benchmarks before fielding
• Implement post-award public reporting requirements
• Balance command input with strategic DoD oversight

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Acquisition officials will manage broader procurement scopes, requiring updated skills. Contracting officers will oversee modified purchases and follow-on contracts, adapting to streamlined processes. Combatant command leaders will submit determinations, increasing their role in acquisition decisions. Program managers will coordinate experiments and fielding, needing flexibility and rapid decision-making capabilities.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Traditional contractors may resist, fearing exclusion from non-competitive follow-ons. Congressional overseers could oppose, citing reduced transparency and competition risks. DoD auditors might object, worried about oversight challenges with less procedural rigor.

Additional Resources

DoD will require funding for expanded prototyping, training for staff on new rules, and additional personnel to support oversight, testing, and combatant command coordination.

Measures of Success

Success can be gauged by experimental project diversity (target: 20% increase), fielding speed (aim: 30% faster), and operational success rates (goal: 85%+), tracked post-implementation.

Alternative Approaches

Selective OT authority expansions could achieve flexibility without broad changes. A digital procurement tracking system might enhance transparency and efficiency without amending A 4023.

Summary

Section 320 evolves experimental procurement for agility and relevance, rooted in decades of reform, but requires careful oversight to balance innovation with accountability and cost control.

Key Points

Section 321 of the FoRGED Act amends Title 10 by adding A 3459, authorizing the DoD to acquire technology-supported capabilities through consumption-based solutions, with new DFARS subcategories and contract types to enhance flexibility and efficiency in procurement.

History of the Recommendation

The concept of consumption-based solutions in DoD procurement evolved from broader efforts to modernize acquisition amid rapid technological change. Traditional fixed-cost contracts, rooted in post-World War II frameworks, struggled with dynamic tech needs, as noted on history.defense.gov. GAO reports criticized rigid procurement for delaying capabilities like cloud computing and software services, advocating usage-based models. The 2016 NDAA's push for commercial practices and the Defense Science Board's (dsb.cto.mil) emphasis on agile acquisition highlighted metering benefits, per innovation.defense.gov. DoD's adoption of as-a-service models (e.g., JEDI cloud) tested this approach, but lacked formal authority. Section 321 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, codifies this shift, building on decades of reform to align procurement with consumption patterns, per crsreports.congress.gov and discover.dtic.mil insights.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Enables flexible acquisition of tech capabilities via usage-based billing
• Introduces "Consumption-based solutions" subcategory, simplifying procurement
• Establishes "Fixed-price resource units" contract type, ensuring cost predictability
• Allows incremental funding, enhancing budget adaptability
• Requires usage notifications, improving resource management transparency

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Metered billing might lead to unpredictable cost overruns
• Broad scope could dilute focus, misallocating resources
• Reduced competition in modifications might favor incumbents
• Incremental funding could complicate long-term budgeting
• Notification thresholds might burden contractors, slowing delivery

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Cap usage limits with regular cost reviews
• Define clear eligibility criteria for solutions
• Require periodic re-competition for modifications
• Integrate funding plans with annual budget cycles
• Automate notification processes to ease contractor load

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Secretaries of military departments will oversee implementation, increasing strategic duties. Contracting officers will manage new contract types and notifications, needing updated skills. Program managers will adapt to metered capabilities, shifting to usage-based oversight. Financial officers will handle incremental funding, requiring flexible budgeting expertise.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Traditional contractors may resist, fearing loss of fixed-price stability. Congressional overseers could oppose, citing cost unpredictability risks. DoD auditors might object, worried about oversight challenges with usage-based models.

Additional Resources

DoD will need funding for metering systems, training on DFARS updates and contract types, and additional personnel to monitor usage and ensure compliance.

Measures of Success

Success can be measured by adoption rate of consumption-based contracts (target: 20% increase), cost savings (aim: 10% reduction), and delivery speed (goal: 15% faster), tracked post-DFARS amendment.

Alternative Approaches

Expanding Other Transaction authority for usage-based deals could avoid statutory changes. A pilot program testing metered billing might refine implementation without broad codification.

Summary

Section 321 modernizes procurement with consumption-based flexibility, evolving from decades of reform, but demands careful cost and oversight management to succeed.

Key Points

Section 401 of the FoRGED Act mandates a comprehensive review by the Secretary of Defense of the DoD's budget and appropriation structure, focusing on simplifying program management, consolidating related budget items, and aligning them with portfolio managers, with a report due within one year.

History of the Recommendation

The push to review DoD's budget structure stems from decades of concerns over inefficiencies in defense acquisition funding. Post-World War II, the DoD's budgeting evolved from broad appropriations to detailed line-item structures, as noted on history.defense.gov. By the 1980s, GAO reports criticized this complexity, arguing it fragmented programs and hindered management. The 1990s saw crsreports.congress.gov analyses highlight misalignment between budget lines and operational needs, slowing innovation. The Defense Science Board (dsb.cto.mil) in the 2000s recommended streamlined funding to match modern warfare demands, echoed by innovation.defense.gov's focus on agility. The 2022 Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform further exposed structural inefficiencies, prompting Section 401 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, to formalize a review addressing these longstanding issues.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Simplifies program management by reducing subdivided budget lines
• Consolidates related programs into single budget items, enhancing coherence
• Aligns funding with portfolio managers, improving oversight efficiency
• Removes outdated appropriation titles, modernizing budget structure
• Provides actionable recommendations, driving legislative and internal reforms

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Consolidation might obscure program-specific funding needs
• Structural overhaul could disrupt ongoing acquisitions, causing delays
• Reduced granularity may limit congressional oversight
• Alignment with portfolio managers might centralize power, risking bias
• One-year timeline could rush analysis, yielding incomplete results

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Retain detailed subcategories within consolidated lines
• Phase changes gradually with transition plans
• Enhance reporting to maintain transparency for Congress
• Establish checks to balance portfolio manager authority
• Extend interim deadlines for thorough analysis

DoD Personnel Most Affected

The Secretary of Defense will lead the review, facing increased strategic responsibility. Budget analysts will assess and redesign structures, requiring new analytical skills. Program managers will adapt to consolidated funding, shifting management approaches. Portfolio acquisition executives will align budgets, gaining influence but needing coordination expertise. Acquisition staff will implement changes, adjusting to revised processes.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Congressional overseers may resist, fearing less control over specific appropriations. Program managers could oppose, valuing current granularity for flexibility. Defense contractors might object, worried about funding shifts disrupting contracts. Budget traditionalists may resist, preferring established structures. Combatant commands could oppose if alignment overlooks operational priorities.

Additional Resources

DoD will require funding for review staff, training on new budget frameworks within one year, and additional analysts to complete the cross-walk and report by the deadline.

Measures of Success

Success can be gauged by consolidated budget lines (target: 20% reduction), management efficiency gains (aim: 15% faster decisions), and portfolio alignment (goal: 80% coverage), assessed post-report.

Alternative Approaches

Incremental budget adjustments via existing DoDI could test changes without a full review. A digital budget analysis tool might identify inefficiencies more efficiently than a mandated overhaul.

Summary

Section 401 addresses decades-old budgeting inefficiencies, aiming for clarity and agility, but requires careful execution to avoid oversight gaps and disruptions within its tight timeline.

Key Points

Section 402 of the FoRGED Act mandates the Secretary of Defense to establish an industrial expansion program, funding activities like reverse engineering and qualification to enhance supply chain resilience, with prioritized funding and exemptions from certain DFARS requirements, favoring prototyping under 10 U.S.C. A 4022.

History of the Recommendation

The roots of Section 402 lie in Cold War-era efforts to bolster industrial capacity, notably the Defense Production Act of 1950, which aimed to secure critical materials, as documented on history.defense.gov. Post-Vietnam, GAO reports highlighted vulnerabilities from diminishing manufacturing sources, pushing for secondary sourcing. The 1990s saw an increased focus on obsolescence, with crsreports.congress.gov noting supply chain risks from single suppliers. The Defense Science Board (dsb.cto.mil) in the 2000s recommended reverse engineering and flexible procurement to counter shortages, echoed by innovation.defense.gov's emphasis on rapid industrial response. Recent NDAAs, like 2021's supply chain initiatives, tested these concepts, but lacked a unified program. Section 402 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, formalizes these efforts, addressing modern contested logistics and cost challenges, building on decades of evolving industrial preparedness strategies.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Enhances supply chain resilience by funding secondary source development
• Mitigates shortages and obsolescence, improving mission readiness
• Streamlines procurement with exemptions, speeding capability deployment
• Prioritizes critical needs, optimizing resource allocation
• Boosts organic capabilities, reducing reliance on external suppliers

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• High funding mandates might strain budgets, diverting resources
• Exemptions could reduce oversight, risking quality or fraud
• Focus on secondary sources might neglect primary supplier stability
• Rapid prototyping preference could lead to untested solutions
• Reverse engineering may infringe intellectual property, sparking disputes

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Phase funding increases with cost-benefit reviews
• Implement periodic audits despite exemptions
• Maintain balanced contracts with primary suppliers
• Require minimum testing for prototypes
• Establish legal protocols for IP compliance

DoD Personnel Most Affected

The Secretary of Defense will oversee program establishment, increasing strategic duties. Contracting officers will prioritize and manage expanded activities, needing new skills. Program managers will handle reverse engineering and qualification, adapting to rapid processes. Supply chain staff will validate data rights and oversee organic equipment, shifting focus to in-house capabilities. Combatant commanders will identify critical items, enhancing their procurement influence.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Primary contractors may resist, fearing lost market share to secondary sources. Congressional budget overseers could oppose, citing high mandated expenditures. Intellectual property holders might object, worried about reverse engineering risks to their rights.

Additional Resources

DoD will need funding for prototyping and organic systems, training for staff on new processes, and additional personnel to manage qualifications, audits, and IP enforcement.

Measures of Success

Success can be measured by secondary source growth (target: 20% increase), mission capability rate improvement (aim: 15% boost), and procurement speed (goal: 25% faster), tracked from FY 2026.

Alternative Approaches

Expanding existing OT authority could achieve flexibility without a new program. A digital supply chain platform might enhance management efficiency more cost-effectively.

Summary

Section 402 builds on historical supply chain concerns, aiming for resilience and speed, but requires careful resource and IP management to succeed.

Key Points

Section 501 establishes review processes for the Act's implementation.

History of the Recommendation

This section addresses the need for systematic program evaluation.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Regular reviews
• Performance assessment
• Quality control
• Continuous improvement

Summary

Section 501 ensures regular and effective program reviews.

Key Points

Section 502 of the FoRGED Act amends 10 U.S.C. A 3136, modifying the Defense Modernization Account (DMA) by removing funding source restrictions, simplifying expenditure rules, and streamlining reporting requirements to enhance flexibility in modernizing DoD systems.

History of the Recommendation

The Defense Modernization Account (DMA) was established under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106) as 10 U.S.C. A 3136, aiming to fund modernization using savings from canceled or restructured programs. Initially, it responded to post-Cold War budget constraints, allowing DoD to redirect unspent funds, as noted on history.defense.gov. GAO reports in the late 1990s criticized its restrictive funding and usage rules, arguing they limited adaptability. The Defense Science Board (dsb.cto.mil) in the 2000s suggested broader flexibility to support rapid tech upgrades, a view echoed by innovation.defense.gov's push for agile resource allocation. Over time, crsreports.congress.gov documented calls to simplify the DMA's complex reporting and expenditure constraints. Section 502 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, refined this framework, easing restrictions to align with modern acquisition needs, building on decades of reform efforts.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Removes savings requirement, broadening funding sources for modernization
• Simplifies expenditure rules, speeding up resource allocation
• Reduces reporting burdens, enhancing administrative efficiency
• Increases flexibility, enabling rapid system upgrades
• Aligns DMA with current DoD priorities, supporting innovation

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Broad funding might divert resources from critical programs
• Reduced oversight could increase misuse or waste risks
• Simplified rules might obscure funding accountability
• Flexibility could lead to inconsistent modernization priorities
• Less reporting may hinder congressional transparency

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Prioritize funding via strategic DoD guidelines
• Retain periodic audits to ensure proper use
• Implement basic expenditure tracking systems
• Establish clear modernization criteria
• Provide annual summary reports to Congress

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Financial managers will oversee broader funding sources, requiring adaptive budgeting skills. Program managers will allocate DMA funds with less restriction, gaining flexibility but needing prioritization expertise. Acquisition officials will expedite modernization projects, adjusting to simplified rules. Budget analysts will reduce reporting tasks, shifting focus to strategic analysis. Senior DoD leadership will set DMA priorities, increasing decision-making responsibility.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Congressional overseers may resist, fearing reduced visibility into spending. Fiscal conservatives could oppose, citing potential waste without savings ties. Traditional program managers might object, preferring dedicated funding over flexible pools.

Additional Resources

DoD will need funding for modernization projects, training on simplified processes, and analysts to track expenditures and prepare annual reports.

Measures of Success

Success metrics include modernization speed (target: 30% faster), resource utilization (aim: 90% of funds allocated), and administrative efficiency (goal: 50% fewer reports), tracked annually.

Alternative Approaches

Creating a new modernization fund could avoid amending existing accounts. Expanding Other Transaction authority might achieve similar flexibility through different means.

Summary

Section 502 streamlines DMA operations for faster modernization but requires balanced oversight to prevent misuse and maintain accountability.

Key Points

Section 503 of the FoRGED Act amends and repeals various budgetary requirements for defense acquisition across multiple laws, eliminating outdated or burdensome provisions to streamline DoD funding processes and reduce administrative overhead.

History of the Recommendation

The history of Section 503 reflects decades of efforts to refine DoD's budgetary framework, which evolved from post-World War II line-item appropriations, as documented on history.defense.gov. By the 1980s, GAO reports criticized the proliferation of specific budgetary mandates�?"such as separate program elements for systems like the F-35 or ballistic missile defense�?"arguing they fragmented funding and slowed acquisitions. The Defense Science Board (dsb.cto.mil) in the 2000s flagged these as impediments to agility, a concern echoed by innovation.defense.gov's push for flexibility. Over time, NDAAs like 2006's (Public Law 109-163) and 2010's (Public Law 111-84) added detailed requirements, intending oversight but often creating inefficiencies, per crsreports.congress.gov. The 2022 NDAA's review of acquisition processes further highlighted redundancies. Section 503 of S.5618, introduced December 19, 2024, by Senator Roger Wicker, consolidates these critiques, targeting repeal of over 20 provisions to modernize budgeting.

Desired Effect of the Recommendation

• Simplifies budget management by eliminating redundant requirements
• Reduces administrative burden, freeing resources for acquisition priorities
• Enhances funding flexibility, speeding up program execution
• Aligns budgeting with current DoD needs, removing outdated mandates
• Improves efficiency by streamlining reporting and oversight processes

Potential Negative Impacts of the Recommendations

• Reduced oversight might obscure program-specific accountability
• Elimination of detailed requirements could misalign funding priorities
• Loss of transparency may hinder congressional monitoring
• Rapid changes might disrupt ongoing budget planning
• Broad repeal could overlook critical niche program needs

Mitigations the Organization Will Take to Diminish the Negative Impacts

• Retain high-level program tracking mechanisms
• Establish strategic funding alignment guidelines
• Provide periodic summary reports to Congress
• Phase out changes with transition support
• Conduct targeted reviews to preserve essential elements

DoD Personnel Most Affected

Budget analysts will adapt to simplified structures, requiring updated skills. Program managers will manage broader funding pools, gaining flexibility but needing prioritization expertise. Contracting officers will face fewer reporting mandates, shifting focus to execution. Financial officers will revise budget plans, adjusting to streamlined processes. Senior DoD leadership will oversee implementation, ensuring alignment with strategic goals.

Stakeholders Opposed and Rationale for Opposition

Congressional overseers may resist, fearing reduced visibility into spending details. Program-specific advocates could oppose, valuing detailed mandates for their projects. Defense contractors might object, preferring predictable funding lines. Auditors may resist, citing accountability risks from less oversight. Combatant commands could oppose if flexibility skews funding away from operational needs.

Additional Resources

DoD will require funding for revised budgeting tools, training on streamlined processes, and additional analysts to ensure alignment and compliance during transition.

Measures of Success

Success can be measured by reduced reporting time (target: 20% less), funding allocation speed (aim: 15% faster), and program execution efficiency (goal: 10% improvement), tracked post-implementation.

Alternative Approaches

Selective pruning of outdated mandates via DoDI could avoid broad repeal risks. A pilot program testing reduced regulations, per innovation.defense.gov, might refine the approach more efficiently.

Summary

Section 503 addresses decades of budgetary inefficiencies, aiming for agility, but requires careful oversight to maintain accountability and alignment with DoD priorities.